The Militarization of Foreign Aid
Gopal Siwakoti ‘Chintan’ and Neeru Shrestha1 Nepal Policy InstituteAttempts to establish a multiparty system within a constitutional monarchy in Nepal have been failing repeatedly since 1950, when the first multiparty constitution was introduced. The first general elections were held in 1958 with the promulgation of the second constitution, but the government was dissolved in 1960 after a coup by King Mahendra, who imposed a partyless Panchayat system that lasted till 1990.
Ruled since then mainly by the Nepali Congress and partly by the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist and Leninist), the country faced many problems. A succession of governments failed to introduce pro-people social and economic policies and to restructure the State security forces. They also failed to implement progressive land reform and to eliminate class and caste-based discrimination. Today over 70% of the 24 million population lives below the poverty line. The Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) launched a Peoples’ War in February 1996.
In an attempt to address the insurgency, the political parties made some efforts at peace through negotiations, but failed mainly due to the vested Indian and western interests in Nepal. Instead of supporting the democratic processes, the US, the UK, Belgium, India and even China began to supply arms to the Royal Nepal Army (RNA) in the name of suppressing the Maoists.
King Gyanendra inherited the throne after the suspicious Royal massacre of June 1, 2003. He dissolved the elected government in October 4, 2004 with the support of the army. He assumed all executive power in February 1, 2005 and is now running the country despite the Supreme Court’s declaration in February 13, 2006 that his rule is unconstitutional. The Maoists are in control of most of the country. The US is supporting the Royal military regime openly and has condemned the agreements between the political parties and the Maoists for a peaceful settlement of the existing crisis.
Military aid to Nepal
Although direct foreign military assistance to the regime is not large, it is politically and symbolically significant. The US provided $12 million in military support to Nepal through Foreign Military Financing (FMF). The amount is nearly 10 times what Nepal received in the decade prior to 9/11. Nepal has also received nearly $0.4 million under the International Military Education and Training program (IMET), and $3 million under Economic Support Fund (ESF) financing.
In 2003, Nepal was provided $0.5 million in IMET, $3 million in FMF and $6 million in ESF. In 2004, Nepal was promised $0.6 million in IMET, $10 million in FMF and $6 million in ESF. To give continuity to its military ties, the US compelled Nepal to sign an agreement with the US Government in April 2003 for the establishment of an anti-terrorist assistance program and to further expand the intelligence network.2
The goal is to prevent Nepal from falling into the hands of a Maoist government. But Nepal has also become a highly strategic location for the US, from where it can intensify its surveillance of China as well as India and Pakistan.
The US has thus become the biggest hindrance to a negotiated settlement of the present crisis. For example, the US is committed to increasing the numerical strength of the RNA from its present estimated number of 78,000 troops to over 200,000 in a few years time. This is opposed by many Nepalese who see no reason for maintaining a permanent army or any further increase in its size, and who believe that a civilian police force will be sufficient to maintain law and order.3 The US is also opposing any involvement of the UN or EU in facilitating the peace process, and is insisting on the unity of the King and the parliamentary parties against the Maoists. And yet the parliamentary parties have declared their commitment to a pluralist republic by writing a new constitution through an elected constituent assembly.4 The latest political development is the conclusion of the second agreement on March 19, 2006 between the seven-party alliance and the Maoists, which further emphasizes the need for the enforcement of the previously agreed 12-point understanding dated November 22, 2005.
The US position is “no peace with terrorists.” In 2004, the US also listed the Maoists as terrorists and provided the Nepal government another $20 million in military aid to discourage peace negotiations. And yet, solving the conflict with the Maoists militarily is only a dream, and even if all the Maoists were killed, the basic problems of poverty elimination, democratization and social security will continue.
In the 1980s, the US provided aid in the western part of Nepal supposedly for integrated development, but grossly failed to deliver development. In fact, the division of the population into rich and poor that it created in that area is one of the root causes of the Maoist uprising.
The European countries’ position towards the Royal military regime is different from that of the US and is rather constructive. Norway has reduced its bilateral financial assistance for 2006 by 15 million Kroner (10%), and has terminated its support for the controversial Melamchi Water Supply Project. It has not entered into any new agreement except for the ongoing Education for All Programme (EFA). Norway has also decided to “focus on effort[s] to promote democracy and human rights, including support to the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) mission in Nepal.”5
Nepal’s donors and lending agencies agree that poverty is one of the main reasons for the Maoist uprising and the tremendous rise in public support for it. Lack of land reform to address poverty, rather than foreign-aid-led poverty alleviation projects managed by corrupt government officials and retired members of the elite, the absence of effective and meaningful decentralization, the replacement of democratization processes by militarization and the continuing socio-cultural exclusion of marginalized groups and communities are the other fundamental problems Nepal faces. Surprisingly, even the World Bank has recognized the Maoists as an ideology-based political movement rooted in poverty and the unequal distribution of development resources.6
Nevertheless, the main problem is the lack of collective realization by Nepal’s donors that negotiation is possible, peace inevitable and development definite with their positive cooperation, or at least non-intervention in the conflict and in development decision-making.
The European Commission is underlining its support for peace and democracy by providing €12 million in assistance for human rights and conflict settlement, and €7 million for conflict mitigation through the National Human Rights Commission and the Supreme Court. The funding is also said to be for providing legal support for those who need it, through the Nepal Bar Association. An additional €5 million is for an international human rights monitoring mission to be managed by the OHCHR.7
Japan has mainly been interested in providing technical assistance in profit-making infrastructure projects. The main purposes of Japanese aid have been to pay for high-cost consultancy, to sell expensive equipment, and the return of most of its aid money through these schemes. Japan is less interested in actual poverty reduction strategies and programs, but claims that big infrastructure projects automatically help poverty reduction.8
Nepal’s immediate neighbors
Both China and India have maintained close ties with Nepal, where they have their own security interests. The amount of aid they provide is fairly high and mainly concentrated in infrastructure development.
The role of India in the Maoist insurgency has been as disturbing as that of the western countries. It considers the Maoist insurgency a “shared security threat”.9 India also has its eyes on Nepal’s huge water resources and the need for dam-building in the Himalayas. In recent years, India has provided huge military support to the Nepali King by giving arms and ammunition as aid or as business in the name of assisting the army in fighting the Maoists.
Although India’s support for the Royal military regime was reduced after the February 1 coup last year, it has not stopped the arms supply even when there are protests from within and outside Nepal. India also maintains the so-called special and secret relationships with Nepal as regards military cooperation.10 There are some doubts about India’s attitude towards the involvement of the UN and/or any other third party in any peace negotiations in Nepal. It reportedly fears that it may set a “bad” precedent towards conflict resolution initiatives in the region in the background of the decades-long Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir and the internal conflict in the North-East of India, or in other SAARC countries. But in November 2005, India made a positive contribution towards conflict resolution by providing shelter and support to Nepali political parties and the Maoists in Indian territory so they could agree to work together in overthrowing the monarchy.11
After India shifted its support to the democratic forces by publicly endorsing their demands and facilitating their meetings within India, the Royal military regime is now turning to China for more help. China is closely watching political events in Nepal for the sake of its own security interests. When all the donor and friendly countries were asking the King to restore democracy and support peace, China considered it an internal affair, expressed hopes for social stability, economic development and national reconciliation, and concern over the anti-government insurgency. It called for peace negotiations at the earliest.12 At the same time, however, China has been selling arms to Nepal and providing military assistance directly despite concerns from India and other countries. It was only in January 2006 when China for the first time expressed its serious concerns over recent political developments in Nepal.13
Security sector reform in Nepal
Security Sector Reform (SSR) is crucial in countries with armed conflicts, provided that it is focused on the democratization of State security forces and making them accountable to the people. It is also important if the reform is about their best use in national development and poverty eradication. It means that SSR can only be justified if a democratic government is in control, and Parliament is not immune from judicial scrutiny for their acts. SSR in these terms should be a fundamental component of democracy, development and human rights.14
Given the poor record of Nepal’s security forces, donors have started showing concern on the impact of the on-going armed conflict on development projects, but it is rather too late for them to go back. The fundamental issue as far as the donors are concerned is the need for them to change their policies and practices so they may address the needs and priorities of poverty reduction and elimination in Nepal. These donors actually helped increase poverty in the past. They are not contributing much at the moment, and the same will prevail in the future even after Nepal achieves peace and needs to reconstruct its economy and to achieve development. The donors and the international community should not only express their concern over deteriorating economic and development situations but should also start correcting their wrongful policies that in the past helped fuel the present conflict. They cannot escape their accountability and responsibility for knowingly funding the Nepalese elite and security forces directly or indirectly.
In spite of the concern of donors over the internal conflict, some major donor countries have supported Nepal with military assistance in their ‘war on terrorism’ directly. This focus overshadowed SSR after 9/11, even if it has had any positive elements. The dual character of most donors — providing military aid on one hand, and talking about democracy and peace on the other — has never been helpful.
According to some analysts,15 the mapping of SSR in Nepal is a delicate and complex process. The loyalty of the security sector to the government, particularly to the RNA is in dispute. The RNA has violated constitutional provisions by defying the executive order of the Prime Minister mobilizing them for counter-insurgency in the past. It took the position that such orders should come from the King as the Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the RNA. The concern in Nepal at present is that SSR is not on the national agenda, because the primary aim of the regime is to strengthen the armed forces and consolidate absolute monarchial power by enhancing the capacity and effectiveness for repression of the State’s coercive apparatuses.
The law governing control of the army should be clear for times of peace and for times of crisis, and whether the threat is internal or external. The security forces should be accountable to Parliament in any situation. Since the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Nepali State is not threatened by any external powers, its national security policy should be towards the decrease in the size of the army. In the current SSR, Nepal was and is not free from donor-driven security sector reform. The increase in the number of armed personnel from 47,411 in 2001 to the current officially claimed figure of 78,000 (which is actually around 90,000 including reserves) is an indicator of the rapid increase in militarization. In the 10-year plan, there is a move to increase the size of the armed forces to 125,000 with more divisional headquarters.16
The maintenance costs of the armed forces have also increased from slightly over Rs. 1 billion (US $14.07 million) in 1990/91 to over Rs. 8 billion (US $112.53 million) in 2004/05.17 On the other hand, Nepal’s civilian police force, with 48,500 personnel, has been supplemented by the Armed Police Force as the army had earlier denied to be engaged in the Maoist conflict unless a national emergency is declared, anti-terrorist laws introduced and a consensus is built among the major political parties.18 The budgetary allocation in the 2000/01 for the police increased two-fold in comparison to that of the army.19 Now Nepal’s security forces comprise the civilian police, the armed police and the royal army (total estimate 142,500 with a 51% increase since 2001)20, and have become the subject of concerns nationally and internationally for their brutality in committing gross violations of human rights as well as war crimes against the international human rights and humanitarian laws which Nepal had ratified. They have also have become so corrupt that even the government officials have to pay them for special security from the Maoists.21 The figures, the tenders and the official statements clearly show that the Royal military is interested in purchasing more and more arms and will not give away their hold on the army even after peace. For this, the army has demanded an additional budget of Rs. 11 billion (US $154.73 million) to improve the security situation in the country.22
Diverting development funds to the army
After intensified attacks by the Maoists on most of the local government bodies — e.g., on Village Development Committee (VDC) buildings — VDC officials moved to the relatively secured District Headquarters for their day-to-day functions. As the people became desperate for access to these VDCs, the government took the chance of taking control of local resources and administrative control by introducing the Integrated Security and Development Programme (ISDP). In ISDP, army officers are the overall in-charge of development decision-making as well as the appropriation of funds. No questions can be raised about the diversion and/or misuse of funds for any other purpose by the army due to fear and their unlimited political power.
There are no legal, administrative or political safeguards and mechanisms to guarantee that aid money is not diverted to military purposes, or that it reaches the people and meets the goal of poverty reduction. No questions can be raised, and the army cannot be held accountable for corruption or illegitimate budget diversion. The army is free to ask any amount of money they want. For example, the army has asked for Rs. 13.86 billion (US $195.21 million) to spend under the so called Unified Command for the year 2004-2005.
Misappropriation of funds
As regards dealing with the conflict and security situation, there are just too many foreign experts and consultants in the country. They may have a role to play in understanding the dynamics of the conflict and in helping convince the international community, particularly the US, that Nepal needs support for peace, and for a peaceful and democratic resolution of the political crisis. But they are not doing this as much as they are engaged in conflict-related projects. This needs to change. The money available for conflict-related activities such as community awareness, mediation and humanitarian work should be channeled directly through local organizations and by involving local experts.
There is a criticism that donors are also pouring money haphazardly to some Nepali and foreign NGOs without even considering their need and capacity. This approach is wrong, costly and imposed from the above. Pouring money for consultants and advocacy groups on conflict does not make any sense unless the Maoist-Government conflict is understood in Nepal’s social, cultural and political contexts and rather than treating it as terrorism. Terrorism is not about any political ideology or resistance, but consists of specific and sporadic acts of violence and terror that are committed more by State security forces rather than armed groups anywhere. Nepal is not an exception.23
Shift in international concerns
The holding of a municipal election by the King on February 8, 2006, was a mess. He used his security forces to field candidates, and forced them to file nominations and to stand for the fake exercise. Some candidates were even kept in army barracks and police stations or sent to India to hide from possible Maoist attacks. The fear was that they may withdraw their candidacies and even resign after the election — which many of them did and are still doing. There was hardly a 20.58 percent turn out. All the major political parties boycotted the election. The seven-party alliance condemned the election and said that the “drama of the so called election staged by massively misusing state force and funds has become a total failure due to the people’s boycott.”24
In a press statement issued from Washington DC, Sean McCormack, spokesman of the Department of State said, “The United States believes Nepal’s municipal election called by the king today represented a hollow attempt to legitimize his power. There was a clear lack of public support for these elections.”25 Nepal’s largest donor country, Japan, deplored that the municipal election was held without broad support from the people of Nepal. In a press statement issued by the Director-General for Press and Public Relations of Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Japanese government said that “What Nepal now needs is for the government and the political parties to reach out to one another with the spirit of reconciliation, and Japan expects that positive steps will be taken soon to that end.”26
India described the poll as lacking in credibility. The statement issued by the spokesperson of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs said, “Any credible electoral exercise should have the active involvement and participation of all mainstream parties. Only then would such elections be able to contribute to the restoration of democracy and political stability.” The statement further said that “the grave challenges facing Nepal demand the initiation of a genuine process of national reconciliation, dialogue and participation which can facilitate a peaceful political settlement.”27
The UK said that “The low level of turnout at the municipal elections indicate that they didn’t have public support”28 and urged the King to reach out to political parties to develop a common agenda for “full return to multiparty democracy” by stressing the need for an inclusive and comprehensive process to achieve a negotiated peace.
During a visit in March 2006, the State Councilor of China, Tang Jiaxuan, said “The Chinese government and the people have never interfered with the internal affairs of Nepal and highly respect the mode of development chosen by the Nepalese people.”29 He emphasized the need for reconciliation among democratic forces and a dialogue among them.
However, this positive shift of the international community towards the peaceful settlement of Nepal’s political crisis is being derailed by US obstructionism. US Ambassador James F Moriarty, in a speech in Kathmandu, criticized the coalition between the seven-party alliance and the Maoists, urged the King to urgently reach out to political parties, and asked the seven-party alliance to withdraw from its agreement with the Maoist rebels. His main worry was that “If the armed Maoists and unarmed parties successfully implement Prachanda’s and Baburam Bhattarai’s vision of a violent revolution, the Maoists will ultimately seize power, and Nepal will suffer a disaster that will make its current problems pale in comparison.”30
As a result of this US diatribe, the King has become even more brutal. His ministers are calling the political parties allied with the Maoists as terrorists.31 The licensing of 10 FM radio stations for a propaganda war against the Maoists is also being considered as part of the King’s ploy towards the total militarization of Nepal with the help of the US.32 During his visit to India in early March 2006, US President Bush urged the King to reach out to the political parties for the restoration of democracy. Bush said, “In Nepal, the Maoists should abandon the path of violence. We (with Indian Prime Minister Man Mohan Singh) agreed that the King should reach out to the political parties for the restoration of democracy.”33
Conclusions and recommendations
• The post 9/11 or the so called “war on terrorism” led by the US has had a tremendous impact on Nepal’s democratization process. The ruthless monarchy and the brutal RNA found a way to survive militarily by usurping all executive and legislative power and suppressing all activities for democracy, human rights and the rule of law. When the civilian governments, the political parties and the Maoists were ready for peace negotiations, the US derailed the peace process by opposing the internal political consensus and by funding and supporting the army overtly or covertly.
• More and more aid resources have been diverted to security in Nepal in the name of the fight against terrorism. The trend of increasing bilateral security arrangements and donor-led security sector reforms is taking more resources from the development sector directly or indirectly. Furthermore, the concentration of wealth, the pro-rich tax system, and the unfair distribution or no distribution of national revenue to those in dire need continue to fuel social unrest and insurgency.
• The securitization of aid, supported by a series of so called anti-terrorist laws, has made the effectiveness of existing development aid more questionable than in the past. The taking of the “poor” peoples’ own resources and the external domination of domestic markets by the forces of privatization and globalization are additional factors contributing to the further increase in poverty and insecurity.
• The tying of development aid to security has tremendous negative impacts on resolving internal conflict. The Maoist insurgency would not have been born if the post-1990 democratic transition was not taken over by the donors with their domination of all economic and development decision-making in furtherance of their interests. They also made the internal democratic process ineffective and the political leadership and technocrats vulnerable.
• The donors need to learn that their unilateral, non-transparent and undemocratic decision-making is not helping Nepal at all. Rather are they increasing donor-dependency and creating a huge debt burden. In the case of Nepal, they must apply a human rights framework to development financing and poverty-reduction measures.
• The donors should not divert the money that is supposed to be for poverty-reduction to ineffective, foreign experts and national NGO elites-led peace or conflict-related projects. They should invest such money in direct peace-building and conflict resolution processes at local levels.
• Finally, there should be no increase in any military expenditure at the cost of funds needed to eliminate poverty. No aid of any kind should be given to an absolutist or military regime and those who oppose peace negotiations and the peaceful transition of a country towards democracy.
• The international community should stop any kind of military assistance to Nepal in the future, suspend all development aid and discontinue the involvement of the RNA and the police force in UN peace-keeping operations till the restoration of democracy, human rights in the country.P.M. Blaikie, John Cameroon and David Seddon
The extent and depth of popular disappointment and disillusionment as the failure of successive governments to deliver the promise of genuinely progressive social and economic policies — particularly after the dramatic rise of the People’s Movements — was not foreseen.
Source: Blaikie, P. et al. 2001. Nepal in Crisis: Growth and Stagnation at the Periphery. Adroit Publishers, Delhi. p. 310.
Nepal’s Budget on Security and Development In Rs. million
Particulars 1995/96 1999/00 2000/01 2001/02 2002/03 2003/04 2004/05 Total Expenditure 46,542(US$ 655) 66,273
(US$ 932)79,835
(US$ 1123)80,072
(US$ 1126)84,006
(US$ 1181)89,443
(US$ 1258)126,885
(US$ 1785)Percent change 42 20 0.2 4.9 6.4 41.8 Total security expenditure 4,053
(US$ 57)6,750
(US$ 95)9,009
(US$ 127)11,987
(US$ 168)13,618
(US$ 192)14,866
(US$ 209)18,786
(US$ 264)Percent change 66.5 33.4 33 13.6 9.1 26.3 Defence Military expenditure 2,126
(US$ 30)3,486
(US$ 49)3,813
(US$ 54)5,860
(US$ 82)7,382
(US$ 104)8,520
(US$ 120)10,905
(US$ 153)Percent change 64 9.4 53.7 26 15.4 28 Police expenditure 1,927
(US$ 27)3,268
(US$ 46)5,195
(US$ 73)6,128
(US$ 86)6,237
(US$ 88)6,346
(US$ 89)7,880
(US $ 111)Percent change 69.6 59 18 1.8 1.7 24 This shows that:
1. Total security expenditure has increased over the years, from 33.4% in 2000/01 and 33% in 2001/02 after the declaration of the first post-1990 emergency rule.
2. During the first few years after the Nepalese emergency, police expenditures increased by double digits, whereas military (army) expenditure did not increase so much. Absolute expenditure for the military was less than that for the police.
3. In 2001/02, military expenditures increased by almost 54% and in double digits during the years after the dissolution of the elected government by the King on October 4, 2002.
Who says what on development aid to Nepal?
Dr. Baburam Bhattarai, the Maoist leader
Financial capital as a social relation logically promotes certain class configurations in society which are conducive to its continued reproduction. Within the present world imperialist order, promotion and/or preservation of capitalist classes would be the natural concern of metropolitan financial capital even during its operation in backward and underdeveloped formations. In the context of Nepal, however, since foreign financial flow takes places exclusively in the form of ‘aid’, the preservation and strengthening of the present class and state structure becomes more direct and glaring. This may be better expressed in the word of a seasoned observer thus:
“… aid has assisted the monarchy both directly and indirectly to create a better-equipped and better trained army and to put a large number of potentially restive, educated young men on the bureaucratic payrolls… Thus, in the short run at any rate, foreign assistance has enhanced the monarchy’s chances of survival and has inhibited the growth of pressures for fundamental change”.
Source: Bhattarai, B. 2003. The Nature of Underdevelopment and Regional Structure of Nepal: A Marxist Analysis. Adroit Publishers, Delhi. p. 383.
Dr. Siera Tamang, gender and development analyst
According to one of Nepal’s leading development analysts, most development agencies have withdrawn to the district headquarters if not Kathmandu. More aid will not ameliorate the situation of those who live beyond the immediate control of the state. Financial commitments now will amount to support for the current counter-insurgency methods of the state. The case of the election budget being diverted for military and palace expenditures highlights the ease with which an unaccountable government can distort budgetary allocations. With gaps in the development finances being filled by donors, the possible militarisation of international aid needs to be taken seriously. The biggest weakness of both the government and the international community is the absence of plans to help the Maoists move from being a military organisation to a political/civilian entity.
Manjushree Thapa (living in self-exile), renowned author of ‘The Tutor of History’ and ‘Forget Kathmandu: An Elegy for Democracy’
“Many foreigners in Nepal’s international community seem to rely more on cocktail hour chatter than on in-depth study to learn about this country, where they wield great influence. Outsiders turn to insiders for insight; they ought to also read up. It would greatly help Nepal if influential foreigners here would read, read, read — not just newspapers. Actual books. And if there aren’t enough good books around, then support the intellectual ferment gathering force today: invest in new scholarships.”
Source: Thapa, M. Educating Foreigners. Nepali Times No. 186, 5-11 March 2004.
LETEST DEVELOPMENT
The political situation has drastically changed in Nepal after the popular April revolution (2006). It was the result of a joint alliance of the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist) and the Seven Party Parliamentary Alliance. Nepal now is moving towards an all party government, and the election of the first ever Constituent Assembly on the writhing of a new Constitution. The popular demand in Nepal is the abolition of the notorious and repressive monarchy.
During the April revolution, the US and India played a clandestine role to save the King Gyanendra, and to sideline the Maoist. They did this by restoring the dead parliament and opposing the demand of the vast masses for an all party national conference for the formation of an interim government and the holding ofthe constituent assembly election.
Leading towards the process of final peace agreement, two additional agreements ment with the CPN (M) recently. The eight point SPA-Maoist Agreement (16 June 2006) process in the country that began from the first 12 point Memorandum of Understanding signed in November 2006. These agreements competitive multi-party system and urged the United Nations to monitor the manage the Maoist leading to the free and fair election to the Constituent Assembly.
Another Important point is the agreement to dissolve the controversial parliament after interim legislature as well as the dissolution of Maoist-led People's Governments of CPN Maoist.The Five-Point Agreement (9 August 2006) is related to the monitoring of human rights situation by the Office of the UN High commissioner for Human Rights in Nepal and the Maoist for an effective ceasefire. It also the management of arms and armed personnel from both the sides. The agreement is that the Maoist forces will be confined within designated cantonment areas, and the Nepal Army in their original barracks.
However, the US and India have been playing a negative role again to maintain the monarchy and sideling the forces of republic of Nepal. They have already offered the resumption of arms supply and their military advisors are in Kathmandu offering 'any help' needed to defeat the Maoist if the peace process breaks up. Unfortunately, the SPA mainly sections of the Nepali Congress and the CPN-UML, have already fallen into the US-led trap willingly to regain their lost credibility and maintain their supremacy at the Constituent Assembly election of the Constituent Assembly. This is possible only when a new constituent Assembly. Sections of the two main parties are even suggesting that Parliament will not be dissolve, that Maoist will be prevented from joining the government and even the election of the Constituent Assembly may never be held.
If the SPA government fails to comply the ultimate result of that the Maoist will be this is what the people of Nepal never want that they would rather launch a peaceful people's struggle to put pressure on the SPA will not go back to war. They also have said that no final management of arms is possible Assembly and they can never accept the Indian strategy. The failure of the SPA government in suspending the key army personnel who were involved in committing serious human rights violations and internal war crimes during the past 10 years of insurgency and the 19-Day April Revolution clearly shows that there is a clear danger of all these pro-monarchical and anti-republican forces planning a military cup against the Maoist if they succeed in the Constituent Assembly. The vast masses of the people, including the indigenous-ethnic communities, Dalits (the people of Terai region) and the other marginalized communities are clear about the need for a republic and a comprehensive restructuring of the state.
Therefore, the need of the time is that all Nepal's neighbors and friendly countries and the 'donors' do not interfere in the internal affairs of Nepal and do not offer any aid of threaten to suspend aid that is not helpful for a peaceful transition to multiparty federal republic of Nepal . The Us is directly threatening Nepal with the suspension of aid if the Maoists are allowed to join the government before giving up arms and till they are de-listed from the US list of terrorist groups. The US is behaving as if Nepal is its colony and thus bound by the US laws and regulations. The issue relating to Nepal's security forces and foreign assistance in the context of the changed situation is radically different. The issue now is of reducing the size f the army and seek a zone of peace status for Nepal through a non aggression treaties with India and China.Finally, one important thing that the US, India and other governments have to understand is that the agenda for a republic of Nepal is not merely the political demand of the Maoist, but of all the vast majority of the people. They have been suffering for centuries under the feudal monarchial upper class dominated racist regime and now they will not tolerate it anymore. History has given them the first chance to over come all social, political and cultural obstacles to change. The spirit and hope they have now is that they can fight back the SPA- government, the Nepal Army and even external interventions peacefully. The agenda of the majority of the people of Nepal and Maoist has become one - that is the establishment of a republic of Nepal through a Constituent Assembly. Therefore, the only constructive role that the donors can play is to give Nepal Unconditional political support and untied aid in support in support of democracy, human rights and poverty eradication.
Notes
1 ‘Chintan’ and Shrestha are directors at the Nepal Policy Institute and members of the Reality of Aid, Asia-Pacific. The authors would like to acknowledge the contribution of Laxman Acharya, Jagadish Parajuli and Prabin Man Singh from Nepal, and Thomas J Mathew and Bela Malik from India.
2 Kumar, D. and H. Sharma. 2005. Security Sector Reform in Nepal: Challenges and Opportunities. Friends for Peace. Series 8, Kathmandu. pp. 34
3 Acharya, N. Annapurna Post (Nepali daily). January 16, 2005.
4 Nepal’s major seven-party alliance and the Maoists signed a Memorandum of Understanding on November 22, 2005 in New Delhi, India.
5 Royal Norwegian Embassy. Press Statement No. 01/05. July 20, 2005.
6 World Bank. Nepal Country Assistance Strategy 2004-2007. p. 9.
7 Benita Ferrero-Waldner, European Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighbourhood policy, said: “To break the cycle of escalating violence in Nepal, it is essential that we boost human rights – and end impunity for those who commit human rights abuses. Today’s announcement shows the EU is committed to help pave the way for a brighter future for the country.”
8 Siwakoti, G ‘Chintan’, “Who’s aiding whom? Poverty, conflict and ODA in Nepal,” In Randel, J. et al. (eds), The Reality of Aid 2002. IBON Foundation, Inc., Manila, pp. 81-87.
9 The Himalayan Times, September 11, 2004.
10 Nepal and India signed a controversial Peace and Friendship Treaty in 1950 followed by a secret arms deal in 1965. The provisions include the understanding and cooperation for mutual security interests and giving priority to Indian arms supplies.
11 Indian Ambassador to Nepal, Shiv Shankar Mukherjee says, “The issue of military supplies is under constant review by the Government of India, taking into account the evolving situation in Nepal. In view of the disturbed situation in Nepal it is a fact that no military supplies have been delivered since February 1, 2005.” India is opposing third party UN mediation in resolving the insurgency. “A third party brings in more complications, my government does not see at the moment the need to muddy the water further. Certainly, an insurgency should be talked to, they have grievances that should be addressed, but the methods they use must be resisted and they must be encouraged to come to the table.” Says Mukherjee. Nepali Times, No 236, 25 February-3 March 2005.
12 Chinese Ambassador Sun Heping, “It is essentially Nepal’s internal affair. As a friendly neighbour, we sincerely hope that Nepal can realise social stability, economic development and national reconciliation. Meanwhile, we respect the choice of the Nepali people for their social system and development in line with Nepal’s national realities. As Nepal’s close neighbour, China is concerned about the issue of anti-government insurgency in Nepal. We strongly condemn any violent activities against civilians and civil infrastructures. Peace and stability in Nepal is not only in the interests of Nepal and its people, but is also conducive to regional peace and stability. We hope that the peace process here can be restarted as soon as possible so lasting peace can be realised at an earlier date.” Nepali Times, No 249, 27 May-2 June 2005.
13 The Kathmandu Post. January 26, 2006.
14 For details, see Kumar, D. and H. Sharma. 2005. op. cit.
15 Ibid.
16 The Himalayan Times. April 20, 2004 and Deshantar Weekly. July 25, 2004.
17 Kumar, D. and H. Sharma. 2005. op. cit., p. 41.
18 Ibid., p. 43.
19 Ibid., pp. 46-47.
20 Ibid., p. 93.
21 Ibid., p. 47.
22 Ibid., p. 60
23 See, Mahat, R.S. 2005. In Defence of Democracy: Dynamics and Fault Lines of Nepal’s Political Economy. Adroit Publishers, Delhi. p. 385.
24 The Kathmandu Post. February 9, 2006.
25 Ibid., February 10, 2006.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., February 11, 2006.
29 Ibid., March 18, 2006.
30 Ibid., February 16, 2006.
31 The Rising Nepal. March 25, 2006.
32 Samay Weekly (in Nepali). No. 2, Issue 96, March 3-9, 2006.
33 The Kathmandu Post. March 3, 2006.
Source: Conflict, Security and Development, The Reality of Aid (ROA), ASIA-PACIFIC EDITION 2006, Page 114-126
URL:http://www.realityofaid.org/roareport.php?table=roa2006&id=11